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Abstract 
Contemporary society can undisputably be characterized, following Ulrich Beck, as a risk 
society. Since catastrophic risks are endlessly multiplying, the scope of risk management 
is broader than ever. This paper addresses more generally the question of how and by 
whom decision making regarding risk management is made in the European Union. More 
precisely, it provides a critical analysis of the legal discourse, on the one hand, on the use 
of the precautionary principle in risk management, and, on the other hand, on 
compensation for individuals who suffer financial losses related to decisions that are 
taken based on this principle. This critique will here be illustrated through an analysis of 
the Giovanni Pesce and Others v. Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri – Dipartimento 
della Protezione Civile and Others case. 
Résumé 
La société contemporaine peut sans contredit être caractérisée, suivant Ulrich Beck, 
de société du risque. Puisque les risques catastrophiques s’y multiplient sans cesse, la 
gestion de risque a une portée plus vaste que jamais. Cet article concerne de manière plus 
générale la question de savoir comment et par qui les décisions concernant la gestion des 
risques sont prises dans l’Union Européenne. De manière plus particulière, il suggère une 
analyse critique du discours juridique concernant le recours au principe de 
précaution dans la gestion des risques d’une part, et, d’autre part, concernant 
l’indemnisation des individus subissant des pertes financières en lien avec les décisions 
prises en vertu de ce principe. Cette critique sera ici illustrée à travers une analyse de la 
décision Giovanni Pesce and Others v. Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri – 
Dipartimento della Protezione Civile and Others. 
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2 
Note d’actualité: Citoyenneté de 
l’Union 1/2017 
May they concern food safety, environment, economic and financial activities, or even 
terrorism, a whole range of catastrophic risks, more than often related to human activities and 
to the industrialization of occidental societies, have been unsettling contemporary society for 
now quite a while1. The issues they have been raising have led jurists to question the form and 
nature of Law itself2; but above all, they have accentuated the importance of a world-wide 
cooperation to rethink the legal discourse about risk management from a supranational point 
of view3.  
In Europe, risks linked to health and environment matters fall under the scope of the 
precautionary principle as recognized by European Union (hereafter EU)4. Still, the aim of EU 
Law is not primarily, or let’s say, exclusively, directed to risk management; one of its major 
objective being to promote development through the good functioning of the single market 
throughout the European Union5. However, this does not mean that the EU does not consider 
risk management in pursuing its objectives; it has indeed a shared competence with Member 
States (hereafter MS) in the fields of environment and common safety concerns in public 
health matters for example6. To some extent, the EU may also intervene in social policies; and 
in their broad understanding, social policies are intertwined with risk management, as it will 
be argued7.  
                                                           
1 This is not to say that the dangers which are apprehended through catastrophic risks did not exist earlier; only, 
it is our conceptual way of thinking that came to acknowledge their existence through the 20th century, with 
major catastrophes such as Chernobyl. Around the years 1970, there would therefore have been a shift from a 
mostly wealth distributive society to a risk distributive society. See U. BECK, La société du risque. Sur la voie 
d’une autre modernité, Paris, Aubier, 2001, p. 38. 
2 We can think for example at the way some authors argue in favor of legal pluralism or legal postmodernism, 
which are also subject to many relevant and convincing criticism. On these legal theories, see for example B. 
MELKEVIK, “Une approche critique de l’idéologie du « pluralisme juridique »”, 2016, [online]: 
http://www.rivistapolitica.eu/une-approche-critique-de-lideologie-du-pluralisme-juridique/; J. CHEVALIER, “Vers 
un droit postmoderne”, in J. CLAM & G. MARIN (ed.), Les transformations de la régulation juridique, Paris, 
LGDJ, 1998, p. 23-24. 
3 See U. BECK & E. GRANDE, “Varieties of Second Modernity: The Cosmopolitan Turn in Social and Political 
Theory and Research”, (2010) 61-3 Br. J. Sociol. 409. 
4 See article 191(2) of the Treaty Establishing the European Union (2002). See also COMMISSION OF THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, Brussels, 
2000, p. 2, where it is specified that even if the Treaty only refers to it when it comes to environment, “[…] in 
practice, its scope is much wider, and specifically where preliminary objective scientific evaluation, indicates 
that there are reasonable grounds for concern that the potentially dangerous effects on the environment, human 
animal or plant health may be inconsistent with the high level of protection chosen for the Community”. The 
precautionary principle can also be found in many national legal systems. For example, in France it has a 
constitutional character. See article 5 of Loi constitutionnelle n° 2005-205 du 1er mars 2005 relative à la Charte 
de l'environnement. It shall also be underlined that not every kind of risk fall upon the scope of the precautionary 
principle; in each situation, it shall be referred to the legal frame that applies to define exactly which ones might. 
5 See article 2 of the Treaty establishing the European Union of 2002: “The Union shall set itself the following 
objectives: to promote economic and social progress and a high level of employment and to achieve balanced 
and sustainable development, in particular through the creation of an area without internal frontiers, through the 
strengthening of economic and social cohesion and through the establishment of economic and monetary union, 
ultimately including a single currency in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty […].” 
6 See the second paragraph of the article 4, sections (e) and (k), of the Treaty on the Functioning of European 
Union of 2012. As for the competence regarding the protection and improvement of health, it is generally a 
supporting competence rather than a shared one, as provided by article 6 and 168 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of European Union of 2012. Some exceptions are however provided in the paragraph 4 of article 
168. 
7 See Title X of the Treaty on the Functioning of European Union of 2012. 
  
 
 
 
© blogdroiteuropeen.com  
 
3 
Note d’actualité: Citoyenneté de 
l’Union 1/2017 
For a non-EU citizen – which the reader might keep in mind is my case –, it is thus more than 
interesting to get acquainted with how decision making regarding risks falls either to MS or 
EU Institutions, and to analyze the situation in relation with broader economic and social 
concerns concerning risk management. This being said, this paper does not mean to draw 
conclusions about positive EU Law; rather, I would like to illustrate how the specific case I 
have presented last spring in a PhD Seminar8, Giovanni Pesce and Others v. Presidenza del 
Consiglio dei Ministri – Dipartimento della Protezione Civile and Others (hereafter Giovanni 
Pesce case)9, can support a critical analysis of the legal discourse, on the one hand, on risk 
management and notably on the use of the precautionary principle, and, on the other hand, on 
financial compensation of individuals that suffer financial losses, either because they are 
affected by the consequences following the concretization of the risk or by the measures taken 
to limit it. 
 
1. An overview of the Giovanni Pesce case 
The Giovanni Pesce case concerns the management of a risk that has received a lot of media 
coverage in Europe for the last few years: the risk of spreading of some bacteria called Xylella 
fastidiosa (hereafter Xyllela). Though it has been present in America for many decades now, 
as far as we know, it would only have reached Europe in 2013 in the south Italy, and has since 
spread quickly10. The health of certain plants types, as mainly olive trees in the south of Italy, 
but also other plants harvested for agriculture purposes in other regions and countries, is put 
in danger by Xyllela. More precisely, it affects such plants by colonizing their xylem tissue, 
that is formed of the tubes through which sap runs. Once a plant is infected, the bacteria 
comes to block those tubes, which causes its leaves to brownish and ultimately, to its death. 
The main vector of the bacteria is said amongst the scientific community to be the flying 
insects that nourish themselves from infected plants’ xylem and sap, since they might as well 
transport Xyllela with them to other plants afterwards.  
As regarding the legal framework in EU law, the Council Directive 2000/29/EC of 8 May 
2000 on protective measures against the introduction into the Community of organisms 
harmful to plants or plant products and against their spread within the Community had 
already listed Xyllela as a harmful organism before Xyllela even reached the European 
continent 11 . Under this directive, the MS have an obligation to notify immediately the 
presence of Xyllela to the Commission and other MS, and have the power to take necessary 
measures to eradicate or inhibit the spread. The Commission also has the power to adopt 
necessary measures to contain or eradicate such a spread, measures which might rescind or 
amend the ones having been taken by a MS. Moreover, the Commission has the obligation to 
follow the evolution of the situation, and to adjust the measures in consequence12.  
                                                           
8  “Recent Developments in Theory and Practice of EU Law”, University of Luxembourg, April 4th, 2017. 
9 Giovanni Pesce and Others v. Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri – Dipartimento della Protezione Civile 
and Others, joined Cases C-78/16 and C-79/16, Judgement of the Court (First Chamber) of 9 June 2016. 
Because the paper does not aim to discuss extensively the case from a EU Law perspective, some aspects of the 
judgement that are less relevant to the proposed argumentation might not be reviewed here.  
10 Its presence has been nowadays noted in other countries such as Corsica and in some regions of France and 
Spain for example. 
11 See Annex 1, Part A, Section I(b). 
12 See the art. 16 of the directive, especially paragraph 1 for the MS, and par. 3 for the Commission. 
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In accordance with this directive, the Commission issued four decisions following the 
notification by Italy of the presence of Xyllela; we will only consider the first three since the 
last one was issued afterwards the Giovanni Pesce case. In the first decision of 2014, the 
Commission adopted emergency measures, and especially prohibited the movements of any 
“plants for planting” in the EU to prevent the spreading13. The second decision of 2014 
contained more details, and especially introduced measures for the removal of infected plants 
and of those showing symptoms in demarcated areas14. In the decision issued in 2015, the 
Commission now stated that all host plants shall be removed in certain zones, regardless of 
their health status, or to say it otherwise, regardless of if they appeared or not to have 
symptoms of an infection by Xyllela 15 . The growing severity in the measures taken is 
correlative to the development of scientific knowledge about Xyllela16, and to the fact its 
spreading had continued at a quick pace; the Commission was reaching further to make sure it 
could limit the spread. 
On the grounds of this third decision of the Commission of 2015, a decree was issued in 
Italy17. Substantially, it was mostly an application of the decision of 2015. It globally stated 
that as soon as a tree was infected by Xyllela, all host plants within 100 meters of it had to be 
cut down by the owners. Some exceptions were however provided in some regions, where the 
removal was not mandatory18. In application of that decree, several Italian national decisions 
notified in July and October 2015 by the Servizio Agricoltura della Regione Puglia ordered 
some specific tree owners where infected trees were found to cut a portion of their olive trees, 
as they are known as “host plants” of Xyllela. The removal had to be done at their own fee, or 
else the decision stated that the trees could be removed by the authorities and charged to the 
owners who did not comply with the decisions. 
Since many olive tree owners did not agree with the cutting of olive trees that might not even 
show to be infected by Xyllela, some of them asked the Tribunale amministrativo regionale 
per il Lazio, a regional administrative court, for the decisions and the decree to be cancelled, 
on the ground the decision of 2015 which they implemented was inconsistent with the 
principle of proportionality and the precautionary principle. But before going forward in that 
case, and because the validity of the EU decision of 2015 was concerned, the administrative 
tribunal suspended the national Italian decisions, while it referred to the Court of Justice for a 
preliminary ruling on the validity of article 6(2)a) of the 2015 Directive under EU Law. The 
question has been summarized by the Court of Justice as follows:  
                                                           
13 Commission implementing decision of 13 February 2014 as regards measures to prevent the spread within the 
Union of Xyllela Fastidiosa (2014/87/EU). Some exception were provided, for example to seeds, and specific 
type of plans having obtained some kind scientific testing. 
14 Commission implementing decision of 23 July 2014 as regards measures to prevent the introduction into and 
the spread within the Union of Xyllela Fastidiosa (2014/497/EU), especially art. 7 and Annex III. 
15 Commission implementing decision (EU) 2015/789 of 18 May 2915 as regards measures to prevent the 
introduction into and the spread within the Union of Xyllela Fastidiosa. See especially art. 6. 
16 For instance, the decision of 2015 referred itself to a detailed scientific study published by the European Food 
Safety Authority (EFSA). See EFSA PLH Panel (EFSA Panel on Plant Health), 2015. Scientific Opinion on the 
risk to plant health posed by Xyllela Fastidiosa in the EU territory, with the identification and evaluation of risk 
reduction options. EFSA Journal 2015; 13(1): 3989, 262 p.  
17 Decreto del Ministero delle Politiche Agricole Alimentari e Forestali n. 2180 con cui sono state disposte 
nuove misure di emergenza per la prevenzione, il controllo e l’eradicazione di Xyllela fastidiosa, 19 June 2015. 
18 The decision of 2015 itself also included exceptions for the province of Lecce, were only containment 
measures had to be taken. See the art. 7 of the Decision 2015/789. 
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“[…] the referring court asks, in essence, whether the obligation imposed on the Member 
State concerned, by Article 6(2)(a) of Implementing Decision 2015/789, to remove host plants 
immediately, regardless of their health status, within a radius of 100 metres [sic.] around the 
plants which have been tested and found to be infected by […] Xyllela, without that obligation 
being accompanied by a compensation scheme, is invalid on the ground of inconsistency with 
EU law, and, inter alia, with Directive 2000/29 […], read in light of the precautionary 
principle […] and the principle of proportionality […].”19 
In its conclusions, the Court of Justice did not find the decision of 2015 to be invalid20. 
In its judgement, the Court of Justice begins the validity exam of the decision of 2015 by 
acknowledging that the Commission had a valid power to adopt protective measures under the 
Directive of 2000, as long as it did not amend or supplement the act by doing so21, which does 
not show to be the case here. Moreover, the Commission had to take into consideration the 
precautionary principle, and the adoption of restrictive measures was to be found justified if 
there was a likelihood of the existence of a risk22. The measures adopted also had to be 
proportionate23. However, since a broad discretion is granted to the Commission, the criteria 
to invalidate a decision on the proportionality basis is high; it should be manifestly 
inappropriate, with regards to the scientific information available at the time the decision was 
taken24.  
The Court of Justice continues by underlining that in implementing the decision of 2015, the 
Commission pursued the same objective that the one of the Directive of 2000, that is to 
“ensure a high level of phytosanitary protection against the bringing into European Union of 
harmful organisms”25. About the legitimacy of the objective thereby pursued, it declares that 
“[i]t is common ground that health protection and the completion in the sector concerned of 
the agricultural internal market constitute legitimate objectives in the public interest pursued 
                                                           
19 A possible internal inconsistency of the provisions contained in its article 6(2) to (4) was also raised, but will 
not be discussed as is it less relevant for the argumentation developed in this paper. See par. 30 and 31 of the 
judgement of 9 June 2016 on the Giovanni Pesce case. 
20 Par. 94 of the judgement of 9 June 2016. 
21 Par. 44 to 46 of the judgement of 9 June 2016. The Court of Justice refers to judgement of 15 October 2014, 
Parliament v. Commission, C-65/13, EU:C:2014:2289, par. 44 and 45). 
22 Par. 47 of the judgement of 9 June 2016. The Court of Justice refers to judgement of 17 December 2015, 
Neptune Distribution, C-157/14, EU:C:2015:823, par. 81 and 82. 
23 Par. 48 of the judgement of 9 June 2016. The Court of Justice refers to judgement of 17 October 2013, 
Schaible, C-101/12, EU:C:2013:661, par. 29. 
24 Par. 49-50 of the judgement of 9 June 2016. The Court of Justice refers to judgement of 22 December 2010, 
Gowan Comércio International e Serviços, C-77/09, EU:C:2010:803, par. 82. On that argument, however, 
Advocate General Bot proposes another approach: “That approach consists in considering that new 
circumstances subsequent to the adoption of an act may not justify its retroactive invalidation but may, if 
appropriate, preclude the lawful execution of measures taken in implementation of that act”. See Opinion of 
Advocate General Bot delivered on 12 May 2016, par. 106. The Court of justice does not mention or especially 
argue on the value of this approach. It does however underlines in par. 51 of the judgement of 9 June 2016 that 
any new information should at least be considered and lead to possible amendments of the measures, referring to 
judgement of 12 January 2006, Agrarproduktion Staebelow, C-504/04, EU:C:2006:30, par. 40. 
25 Par. 53 of the judgement of 9 June 2016. The Court of Justice refers to judgement of 30 September 2003, 
Anastasiou and Others, C-140/02, EU:C:2003:520, par. 45. 
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by EU legislation”26. The question is then rather to see if the decision was appropriate and 
necessary to attain those objectives. 
The causal link between Xyllela and the rapid dying of a high quantity of olive trees in the 
Puglia region in Italy has then been analyzed. The Court concludes that the validity of the 
disposition is not affected by such matter, since it is not contested that olive trees are host 
plants, and since there is at least a significant correlation between Xyllela and the pathology 
that olive trees show, and finally because the precautionary principle justifies taking measures 
even when the causal link is not clear27. Hence, the Commission decision to enforce removal 
of host plants was, in the opinion of the court, appropriate, necessary, and proportional, 
especially since there would not have been less restrictive measures. 
In a second time, the validity exam is drawn towards the obligation to remove all host plants 
located within a radius of 100 meters around an infected plant regardless of their health status. 
In looking at the reasonable character of the radius, the Court of Justice takes on that scientific 
data available at the time of the decision of 2015 showed uncertainty about what other factors 
than flying insects were indeed influencing the transportation of Xyllela, as man and wind 
could also be vectors. It was also unclear if flying insects could fly further than 100 meters 
from an infected plant. To restrict the radius of removal to 100 meters however seemed in the 
circumstances to be effective, without being over precautious in reaction of the many 
uncertainties. With that in mind, the Court of justice agrees that the radius of 100 meters is 
appropriate and proportionate, since it “was limited to what is necessary for attaining the 
objective sought”28. 
Then, regarding the fact that obligation to remove host plants exists regardless of the plants 
health status, the Court of Justice first clarifies the interpretation of the notion of 
“eradication”, and chooses a broad interpretation, in accordance with the scope of the 
directive. This interpretation considers that not only the bacteria, but also the non-infected 
hosts’ plants, can be objects of the measures adopted by the Commission. At that time, it must 
be said that the scientific evidence had suggested that a plant could be infected even if it did 
not show symptoms, or even if the tests came back negative. In that context, the Court of 
justice agrees that the measure is appropriate29. The proportionality test nonetheless considers 
the balance of the different interests:  
“[…] EU legislator was obliged to reconcile the various interests at stake, namely, first, inter 
alia, the right to property of the owners of olive trees in the Puglia Region and the economic, 
social and environmental consequences for that region following the removal of the affected 
plants and, second, the importance of plant production in the European Union and the public 
interest in safeguarding effective protection of EU territory, including Italian territory beyond 
                                                           
26 Par. 55 of the judgement of 9 June 2016. The Court of Justice refers to judgement of 17 October 2013, 
Schaible, C-101/12, EU:C:2013:661, par. 35 and the case-law cited. 
27 Par. 57-60 of the judgement of 9 June 2016. Moreover, the Court of Justice specifies that no evidence has been 
given to support any allegation of a lack of causal link. See par. 61. 
28 Par. 64-68 of the judgement of 9 June 2016. The Court of Justice refers by analogy to judgement of 12 July 
2001, Jippes and Others, C-189/01, EU:C:2001:420, par. 120. 
29 Par. 69-73 of the judgement of 9 June 2016.  
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the province of Lecce, against the spread of the bacterium Xyllela throughout the European 
Union.”30 
To assess how the interests were taken into consideration, the Court of Justice acknowledges 
that the obligation to remove trees has come only after less restrictive measures had been 
taken in previous decisions. First there was the simple prohibition of movement, and then the 
removal of only the known-to-be-infected plants31. This let us think that the right of property 
and the economic interests of the owners of olive trees have been taken into consideration, 
and that it was only after that the situation showed to be out of control that they have been 
more violated. Also, the fact that there was still a rapid spread of Xyllela seems to have made 
the balance lean towards the general interests of the European Union rather than the ones of 
Italy only. Furthermore, the Court has acknowledged that special measures have been put into 
place in the province of Lecce, where eradication did no longer seem possible. Hence, the 
removal measures of all host plants regardless of their health status would only concerns 
regions where scientific data have shown there were still chances of success in the eradication 
of Xyllela32. And since scientifics did not see at the moment any less restrictive measures 
available, the removal was therefore the only one that seemed to provide an effective limit to 
the spread of Xyllela, and seems proportionate in the opinion of the Court33. 
The Court of Justice also had been asked to consider the absence of a compensation scheme to 
the benefit of the owners who would have to cut down their olive trees. When the measures 
adopted are likely to cause some losses, EU legislator actually has a power to attribute full or 
partial compensation, which was not done in the decision of 2015. This power is however 
discretionary, and the EU jurisprudence shows no existing general principle according to 
which compensation would always have to be attributed to owners as soon as their property is 
damaged34. If there is no such general right to compensation in EU Law, the Court of Justice 
nonetheless considers if article 17(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which states a 
right to compensation for the loss of property, shall apply35. In its opinion, this article of the 
Charter would not impose an obligation to the Commission to adopt compensation measures 
whenever one of its decisions might lead to a loss of private property. In addition, the Court of 
Justice specifies that the absence of a compensation scheme in a decision of the Commission 
does not infringe the individual right to compensation under the Charter, without arguing 
weather they would have a well-founded claim on the basis of art. 17(1)36. 
                                                           
30 Par. 74 of the judgement of 9 June 2016. 
31 Par. 75-76 of the judgement of 9 June 2016. 
32 Par. 78-79 of the judgement of 9 June 2016. 
33 Par. 80 of the judgement of 9 June 2016. 
34 Par. 84 of the judgement of 9 June 2016. The court of Justice refers to judgement of 10 July 2003, Booker 
Aquaculture and Hydro Seafood, C-20/00 and C-64/00, EU:C:2003:397, par. 85. 
35 This provision states that “no one may be deprived of his and her possessions, except in the public interest and 
in the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject to fair compensation being paid in good time 
for their loss” and that “the uses of property may be regulated by law in so far as is necessary for the general 
interest”. Those excerpts of the Charter are cited by the Court of Justice in par. 85 of the judgement of 9 June 
2016. 
36 Par. 86 of the judgement of 9 June 2016. It shall be underlined that the Advocate General Bot goes much 
further about the effective right of the owners to be compensated. Must we remember however that the question 
asked to the court concerns the validity of the decision of 2015; it is not asked to rule on whether the olive tree 
owners have a valid claim against the Member States. However, the Court of Justice’s opinion does not go 
  
 
 
 
© blogdroiteuropeen.com  
 
8 
Note d’actualité: Citoyenneté de 
l’Union 1/2017 
Finally, the observance of the obligation of the Commission to state reasons is analyzed37. In 
the opinion of the Court, such an obligation does not imply that the Commission had to state 
“every relevant point of fact and law”, especially “where the Member States have been 
closely associated with the process of drafting that measure and are thus aware of the reasons 
underlying it” 38 . The Court of Justice continues by specifying that to state the essential 
objective pursued is sufficient, and that to state reasons for every technical choice would 
represent an excessive burden for the Commission39. Hence, the Commission would have 
stated its main objective that was to strengthen the eradicating measures because of new 
spreading of Xyllela, with consideration of new scientific data provided, while keeping the 
measures proportionate by limiting them to only host plants. Therefore, it did not have to 
present additional reasoning for the adoption of measures in the decision of 201540. 
 
2. A critical discussion around the Giovanni Pesce case and risk management  
To criticize the legal discourse about risk management represents an enormous task, that is 
without any doubt beyond the scope of this paper. For that matter, the discussion will be 
limited to only bring up, in a non-exhaustive manner, some possible arguments and questions 
that would be relevant for a critic of the precautionary principle, and of the compartmentation 
of precautionary measures and compensation schemes41; the whole shall be seen being part of 
a wider societal critic, about the democratic character of today’s societies42. 
 
The precautionary principle – a legal procedural tool for legitimising precautionary 
measures 
As most of the literature underlines, the content of the precautionary principle has been 
subject to many debates43, and what it really implies has often been a source of confusion44. 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
against the one Advocate General Bot, and even makes use of some of the points he has brought up. See Opinion 
of Advocate General Bot delivered on 12 May 2016, par. 126-141. 
37 Under the article 296 of the Treaty, “[…] Legal acts shall state the reasons on which they are based and shall 
refer to any proposals, initiatives, recommendations, requests or opinions required by the Treaties. […]” 
38 Par. 88 of the judgement of 9 June 2016. The Court of Justice refers to judgement of 18 June 2015 in Estonia 
v. Parliament and Council, C-508/13, EU:C:2015:403, par. 58, and to judgement of 9 September 2004, Spain v. 
Commission, C-304/01, EU:C:2004:495, par. 50. 
39 Par. 90 of the judgement of 9 June 2016. The Court of Justice refers to judgement of 18 June 2015, Estonia v 
Parliament and Council, C-508/13, EU:C:2015:403, par. 60. 
40 Par. 91-92 of the judgement of 9 June 2016. 
41 For a more extensive study on this subject, in relation to Canada and Quebec’s Law, see P. DUFOUR, “Le 
discours juridique dans la “société du risque”. Regard réflexif sur l’évolution de l’assurance et du principe de 
précaution en droit”, master thesis, Québec, Université Laval, 2016 [Online]: 
http://theses.ulaval.ca/archimede/?wicket:interface=:2::::  
42 Of course, one could ask why we should see in democracy the ultimate sociopolitical form of society; that is, 
however, not a question we shall discuss here. Let’s just say the democratic ideal indeed has become a common 
ground, at least in the Western countries. About the rise of democracy as the ultimate political way of 
organization, and although its leading thesis about the consequences and its conception of democracy might have 
been criticized, see F. FUKUYAMA, The End of History and the Last Man, London, Penguin, 2012. 
43  The Commission acknowledges the indeterminateness surrounding the precautionary principle. See 
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary 
Principle, Brussels, 2000, p. 2. 
  
 
 
 
© blogdroiteuropeen.com  
 
9 
Note d’actualité: Citoyenneté de 
l’Union 1/2017 
Even though no legislative definition is provided in EU law45, the Court of Justice gives one 
that is generally accepted: “where there is uncertainty as to the existence or extent to risks to 
human health, protective measures may be taken without having to wait until the reality and 
seriousness of those risks become fully apparent”46. Still, that “definition” does not help to 
circumscribe the scope of the principle, and if it has a specific content.  
Some authors have talked about the existence of two contradictory conceptions of the 
precautionary principle 47 . In that sense, on one hand, the principle would be in some 
jurisdictions interpreted in a “strong” way, as meaning that a technology or a practice should 
not be taken until the absence of risk is proven, and that strong actions shall be taken to 
prevent the risk. This could be said to represent a kind of protectionism that would prevent 
economic development and technological innovations. On the other hand, there would also be 
what is known as a “soft” conception of the principle, a more utilitarian one, that would give 
more importance to the economic criteria in the analysis of the situation, in the broad sense. 
On the contrary to the first conception, this one would therefore promote the taking of action 
even in risky contexts; still, it should be worth pursuing the activity in regards of the specific 
risks it may involve. In the Giovanni Pesce case, the advocate general seems to go forth with 
this last and “soft” conception, when he addresses the applicant’s argument based on the 
precautionary principle:  
“It must be stated that that plea is based on an incorrect interpretation of the precautionary 
principle which, far from precluding any measure in the absence of scientific certainty, on the 
contrary, legitimises the action of the EU institutions, even though they face a situation of 
scientific uncertainty. That principle is, according to the classic formula, not a principle of 
abstention, but the principle of action in the situation of uncertainty.”48 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
44  Facing this blurriness, the Commission issued a communication that “seeks to establish a common 
understanding of the factors leading recourse to the precautionary principle and its place in decision making, and 
to establish guidelines for its application based on reasoned and coherent principles”. See COMMISSION OF THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, Brussels, 
2000, p. 8. 
45 Altough no general definition is provided in EU law of the precautionary principle, there is however a 
definition in the specific context of food law. See the first paragraph of article 7 of the Regulation no. 178/200 of 
the European Parlieament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and 
requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in 
matters of food safety : “ 1. In specific circumstances where, following an assessment of available information, 
the possibility of harmful effects on health is identified but scientific uncertainty persists, provisional risk 
management measures necessary to ensure the high level of health protection chosen in the Community may be 
adopted, pending further scientific information for a more comprehensive risk assessment ”. 
46 Par. 47 of the judgement of 9 June 2016. The Court of Justice refers to judgement of 17 December 2015, 
Neptune Distribution, C-157/14, EU:C:2015:823, par. 81 and 82. 
47  This dichotomy is often described as seeing the precautionary principle either by a rule of action or a rule of 
abstention. See O. GODARD, “Le principe de précaution, une nouvelle logique de l'action entre science et 
démocratie”, (2000) 11 Philosophie politique 17, 29 and following. In addition, it shall be underlined that a 
multitude of intermediary position can be found, sometimes because of different formulations in the principle, 
because different type of measures might be promoted, etc. In other words, there are different degrees of 
precaution : “Il y a des degrés dans la précaution”. Voir F. EWALD , “Philosophie politique du principe de 
précaution”, in F. EWALD, G. GOLLIER & N. DE SADELEER, Le principe de précaution, Que-sais-je?, Paris, 
Presses de l’Université de France, 2008, p. 25. 
48 Opinion of Advocate General Bot delivered on 12 May 2016, par. 115. 
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One could argue that the adoption of such a “soft” conception also results from the way the 
measures were adopted so gradually, instead of ordering a radical mass eradication to protect 
the more possible from a spread of Xyllela. Besides, this gradation in the measures taken by 
the Commission was one of the reasons which led the Court of Justice to say they respected 
the principle of proportionality49.  
Still, whichever interpretation or “strength” one might give to the precautionary principle, 
which might reveal moral or ethical orientations50, it all comes down to how the institutional 
decision making about if and how to manage a risk should be framed 51. Because of the 
scientific uncertainty that characterizes the types of risks to which the precautionary principle 
applies, the decisions that must be made cannot rest solely on scientific data; rather, they have 
a fundamentally political character, since they refer to the level of social acceptability of a 
risk52. Therefore, any decision on if a risk should be taken or not, and which measures should 
be put into place to contain it, finds its legitimacy whenever the precautionary principle has 
been “followed”, as Advocate General Bot has underlined. 
It should also be remembered that the emergence of the precautionary principle relates to 
something broader than only dealing with the concretization of catastrophic risks; above 
having developed an higher acuity to dangers that might be surrounding us, catastrophes 
brought Western societies to realize that contrary to what might have been thought throughout 
the early modernity, human kind could not control nature, and that all innovations of 
industrial societies have effects that we might either not be able to limit, or plainly not be able 
to acknowledge due to the limits of scientific models53. In this sense, the delimitation of what 
constitutes the risk through the application of the precautionary principle, but also the possible 
broad causal links – not in the legal sense of causality – and the potential responsible actors, 
are crucial54. Hence, this explains why the precautionary principle has traditionally been used 
                                                           
49 Regarding proportionality: “Proportionality means tailoring measures to the chosen level of protection. Risk 
can rarely be reduced to zero, but incomplete risk assessments may greatly reduce the range of options open to 
risk managers. A total ban may not be a proportional response to a potential risk in all cases. However, in certain 
cases, it is the sole possible response to a given risk”. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 
Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, Brussels, 2000, p. 3. 
50 In any case, when an orientation in applying the precautionary principle is given beforehand, one could see it 
would rather consist in precautionary ethics, or in the adoption of a precise conception of what is right; such 
positive shall be distinguished from the precautionary principle itself, and its essentially procedural character. 
See F. EWALD, “Philosophie politique du principe de précaution”, in F. EWALD, G. GOLLIER & N. DE SADELEER, 
Le principe de précaution, Que-sais-je?, Paris, Presses de l’Université de France, 2008, p. 27; M. BOUTONNET, 
Le principe de précaution en droit de la responsabilité civile, Paris, LGDJ, 2005, p. 252; C. KERMISCH, Le 
concept de risque. De l’épistémologie à l’éthique, Paris, Tic & Toc, 2011. 
51 There would indeed be at least two steps, the first being to decide if any action shall be taken at all regarding a 
risk, and the second being to decide which measures should be taken if it is decided to act. See COMMISSION OF 
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, Brussels, 
2000, p. 12.  
52  See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Communication from the Commission on the 
Precautionary Principle, Brussels, 2000, p. 15. 
53 The lack of knowledge about contemporary risk can be pictured in three ways: he conscious inability-to-know, 
the repressed or unconscious non-knowing, and the unknown inability to know. See U. BECK, World at Risk, 
Cambridge, Polity Press, 2009, p. 126-127.  
54 Some scholar has argued that the legal discourse would mostly be impermeable to the constructive nature of 
risks, and use the term “risk” in a superficial manner. This would in his opinion be in relation with the dominant 
positivism in Law. This might, as he underlines, not help the scientific and political spheres to communicate in 
risk management matters. See J. PIERET, “Épistémologie du risque: la troisième voie d’Ulrich Beck et son 
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as a legitimation procedural tool in relation to new technologies, scientific innovations or 
some other kind of “human activities”; we can think of GMO’s, nanotechnologies, new 
medical treatments, pesticides, etc.55  
However, in the Giovanni Pesce case, a first level reading leads to the understanding that the 
precautionary principle is used purely to legitimize taking measures to prevent nature – some 
bacteria – from harming nature – plants. To say it otherwise, the only aspect of the risk that is 
assessed is the one of the spreading of Xyllela. What might be surprising about this is that the 
role of human activities is nowhere really discussed in the judgement regarding the 
application of the precautionary principle, whereas the latter should precisely aim at 
questioning our own contribution to such risks as the spread of Xyllela. It should bring us to 
question our way of using nature, and in this case, our agricultural methods, which are 
influenced by the globalization of the market.  
Indeed, as a study of 2013 suggests56, big monocultures, vast fields where just one type of 
plant as olive trees are harbored, could amplify drastically the spreading of the infection. For 
instance, in the South of Italy, the study argues that cultivated olive trees have shown to have 
a less complex relationship with the ecosystem, with mushrooms, the ground, and insects for 
example, than savage type of olive trees. Such a less complex relationship would increase the 
vulnerability of olive trees to Xyllela infections. The authors of the studies also suggest that to 
mix savage and cultivated olive trees would then help to fight against infections, as the savage 
trees would be more resistant to Xyllela.  
This is obviously not to say that the EFSA’s opinion was right or wrong57, but to wonder what 
were the specific orientations of the questions that were asked before collecting data, and the 
impact on the conclusions of the study. In the management of contemporary risks, the 
orientation of scientific research, of the questions that we think should be answered, and of 
the delimitation of what is the risk is indeed crucial, and especially delicate tasks58. And 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
influence sur la doctrine environnementaliste”, (2012) 17 Lex electronica 1, 9-11. Risks are, however, not 
exclusively a social construction, and still have a certain dimension that relates to reality; Beck would say they 
are a scientific construction of reality. See U. BECK, World at Risk, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2009, p. 26. 
55 Indeed, the precautionary principle provides mainly a procedure that must be followed before going forward 
with any of those kinds of situations which give rise to such undefined risks. More than often, the procedure will 
put into balance different interests, and even give the opportunity to different social actors and groups to submit 
their position about the envisaged situation. Once the procedure has been followed, if the conclusion is that the 
technology, innovation or activity is not prohibited, because of the legal procedure, the risk taking it implies 
acquires some kind of legitimation. However, to ask if this legitimation has a deep democratic character or not is 
another question. 
56  G. BESNARD et al., “The complex history of the olive tree: From late quaternary diversification of 
Mediterranean lineages to primary domestication in the northern Levant”, (2013) 280(1756) Proceedings of the 
Royal Society B, as cited in http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2015/04/27/xylella-fastidiosa-accident-
industriel_4623366_3232.html. 
57 It must be disclaimed that the EFSA study has not been read and hence, it cannot be said that it does not 
consider similar information. However, the Court of Justice still did not appear to look for that kind of scientific 
data especially, nor was it directly invited to do so in the questions that has been brought before it. Should it have 
a broad competence to bring up such matters ex officio? Should third parties, scientific or social groups for 
instance, have the right to intervene in such cases? No research has been made for this paper to see what is the 
current state of EU law about these matters. 
58 “But not only can real uncertainties not be resolved through more and better knowledge, when we are dealing 
with what Anthony Giddens calls manufactured uncertainties, more knowledge can actually produce more 
uncertainty”. See. U. BECK & J. WILLMS, Conversations with Ulrich Beck, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2004, p. 
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taking position about such matters has consequences on the way social and economic interests 
can be weighed while decisions are being made about risk management, and to the width of 
the measures that should be considered. In the Giovanni Pesce case for example, and in a 
purely speculative way, we could think that if the agricultural methods used had been 
included as a component of the risk, then the measures might have been different. It might 
have been considered to gradually prevent monocultures through the EU, to develop some 
certifications that assess a plant harvested in a region has an adequate relation with its 
environment, etc.59 
In addition to the legitimation of the measures themselves, it must be underlined that the 
precautionary principle, as it has been mobilised in the Giovanni Pesce case, also shows to be 
a tool that legitimises the harm to private property that is caused by the eradication of olive 
trees, which has been characterised as an expropriation under the article 17 of the Charter of 
fundamental rights. Indeed, only public or general interests can justify an expropriation60. 
Measures adopted on the behalf of the precautionary precaution, if the procedure is rightly 
followed, could seem to benefit from a “presumption” of promoting such public interest. The 
precautionary principle would therefore also justify that individuals without a general “right” 
to compensation have to support lots of inconvenient (economic loss, having to replant olive 
trees or change their source of income, claim damages or compensation for loss before 
tribunals, etc.) for the sake of public interest, which scope is hard to measure with 
exactitude61.  
The compensation schemes 
The second topic that I meant to address in this paper is the kind of critical arguments which 
can be withdrawn from the way compensation matters were treated in the Giovanni Pesce 
case. To ensure a link with the emergence of contemporary risks and of the precautionary 
principle that we’ve just discussed, a short contextual reminder is useful. 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
127. Regarding such manufactured uncertainties: “[t]hese types of internal risks and dangers presume a threefold 
participation of scientific experts, in the roles of producers, analysts and profiteers from risk definitions. Under 
these conditions, many attempts to confine and control risks turn into a broadening of the uncertainties and 
dangers”. See U. BECK, World Risk Society, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1999, p. 140. 
59 These considerations are of course more important from a long-term perspective of risk management, and 
might therefore not have been of a crucial importance in the establishment of emergency measures to limit the 
risk of spreading of the infection, nor in the subsequent ones. This shall not mean, however, that such 
information was not relevant at all, since it could have lead to different recommendations for the measures to be 
taken. Moreover, it would be interesting to address the question of how the proportionality of a measure could be 
influenced by the lack to acknowledge the need of taking long-term measures, even in an emergency context.  
60 “[…] modern constitutional States allow for expropriations only for the satisfaction of a public or general 
interest […]”. See D. U. FERNÁNDEZ-BERMEJO, « A Theory on Private Takings: Rule of Law, Democracy and 
Social State », (2016) 28-3 European Review of Public Law 881‑905, 885. 
61 On the notion of the evolution of the “public necessity” criterium legitimising the destruction of private 
property without having to compensate for it in common law, and its potential abuses, see O. M. REYNOLDS, « Is 
“public necessity” necessary? », (1976) 29 Oklahoma Law Review 861‑881. For an example of a case in which 
an American court refused any compensation to the owner of trees that had been destroyed to prevent the spread 
of a disease, claiming the protection of the trees of nearby owners were more important according to public 
interest, see J. A. COHAN, « Private and Public Necessity and the Violation of Property Rights », (2007) 83 
North Dakota Law Review 651‑725, 726. 
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During the 19th century, with pauperism caused by the new working conditions provided with 
industrialisation, nation-states have come to provide social insurances to its citizens, and 
gradually developed as what is known to be the Welfare State model. This model that 
provided through “social Law” financial compensation to individuals regarding the direct 
harms of industrialization they had to deal with. The risks that were managed by such social 
laws, as work accidents insurances and health care, could still be “measured” or “calculated”, 
and could be evaluated in reference to what sociological laws would point at being a “normal” 
state or situation62. This insurantial society63 was essential to the pursuing of modernity’s 
project of industrialization, mainly because economic actors would not have to be found 
socially and legally responsible for poverty, diseases or employment instability which was 
becoming the current state of the capitalist market economy organization.  
With the globalization of the markets, and with the emergence of catastrophic risks that have 
been discussed above, the relation between risk management and the nation-state became less 
self-evident. On one hand, risks could not be calculated as before, and on the other hand, the 
consequences were neither geographically limited to a state, nor could its causality be 
attributed to only one activity performed by a specific actor. Moreover, the foreseen 
consequences of contemporary risks can hardly be repaired financially64. In this sense, U. 
Beck argues that the risks of the risk society go beyond the scope of insurability, may it be 
public or private insurances65. To say it otherwise, risk management cannot proceed by only 
providing social security through insurances, it cannot mean only to minimize financially the 
consequences: 
“Insurance protection (whether private or state organized) had a twofold function from the 
perspective of social theory, namely neutralizing damage and thereby neutralizing fear. To 
the extent that the expansion of risk outstrips insurance protection, the latter loses its function 
of neutralizing fear at both the social and the political level, behind the still intact Potemkin 
façade of insurance protection. Free-floating fears are being set free, especially within the 
(full coverage) milieu of the European welfare states, which are open to political 
instrumentalization by all kind of actors and groups.”66 
In the Giovanni Pesce case, we saw that the Commission, through an application of the 
precautionary principle, took measures in several decisions to respond to the possible spread 
                                                           
62  See F. EWALD, L’État providence, Paris, Bernard Grasset, 1986, p. 161-167. See also A. SUPIOT, La 
gouvernance par les nombres. Cours au Collège de France (2012-2014), Paris, Fayard, 2015, p. 135.  
63 The expression Insurantial society is used here as a translation of the expression Société assurantielle as used 
by the French philosopher François Ewald. It refers mainly to a society which the political diagram is inspired by 
insurance, that thinks itself through insurance patterns and whose juridical system is based on an insurantial 
imaginary. See F. EWALD, L’État providence, Paris, Bernard Grasset, 1986. 
64 On the characteristics of contemporary risks, see U. BECK, “Living in the World Risk Society”, (2006) 35(3) 
Economy and Society 329, p. 333-334. 
65 The Risk Society is a concept that has mainly been thought by the German sociologist Ulrich Beck. For Beck, 
the Risk Society is to be found whenever the catastrophic nature of risks make them uninsurable. The threshold 
he proposes is therefore closely linked to the ability to calculate risks or not. See for example U. BECK, World at 
Risk, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2009, p. 132. This position has been much criticized, as some scholars argue that 
insurances can deal with uncalculable risks. See R. V. ERICSON & A. DOYLE, «Catastrophe risk, insurance and 
terrorism», (2004) 33-2 Economy and Society 135. Without engaging further in this discussion, let’s remind that 
new insurance technics to address unknowns and incalculability makes much use of elaborate financial 
structures; such complex use of finance does have shown its own catastrophic potential with the crisis of 2008. 
66 U. BECK, World at Risk, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2009, p. 139. 
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of Xyllela, measures that lead the Italian authorities, that implemented those measures, to 
impose the eradication of a large amount of olive trees. The owners had not only to eradicate 
at their own fee, but were practically offered no special compensation from the EU level, or 
from Italian state, at least from what we can learn in the judgement. This means, from a global 
perspective, that financial impacts of the measures meant to protect agriculture in the whole 
EU community against a possible Xyllela spread, if any kind of compensation is indeed 
offered, should be supported by the state of Italy.  
At first sight, it could therefore look, from a totally external reading of the situation, as if the 
state of Italy were, or were made, responsible – in the broad general sense, and not meaning 
legally liable – for supporting financially the risk management of Xyllela infection. It is true 
that the infection has spread over its territory first, and has brought up an European-wide risk 
to the environment and to the European economy. To put it otherwise, Italy would appear as 
the “guilty” state because it is the epicenter of the risk. However, underneath, we do learn that 
Italy could have made a request to get a co-funding from the EU67, which shows a certain 
level of solidarity between MS, though an “underground” solidarity 68 . This possible co-
funding covers generally up to a maximum of 50% of eligible costs69, such as the “costs of 
compensating the operators or owners for the treatment, the destruction and subsequent 
removal of plants, of plant products and of other objects […]” and for the “costs of 
compensating the owners concerned for the value of the destroyed plants, plant products or 
other objects subject to the measures referred to in Article 16 of Directive 2000/29/EC, 
limited to the market value of such plants, plant products and other objects as if they had not 
been affected by those measures […]”70. Still, the proportions of the amount that would be left 
to Italy to support makes us question about the beneficiary of the expropriation measures that 
constitute the eradication of olive trees: is it Italy, or more broadly the EU? Because indeed, 
“[s]ince modern constitutional States allow for expropriation only for the satisfaction of a 
public or general interest, it may be assumed that […] there will always be a collective or 
diffuse beneficiary: the community to which that public or general interest refers”71. Hence, to 
the extent to which the eradication measures were meant to tame the risk of the infection 
                                                           
67 See Regulation (EU) No 652/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014 laying down 
provisions for the management of the expanditure relating to the food chain, animal health and animal welfare, 
and relating to plant health and plant reproductive material, amending Council Directives 98/56/EC, 
2000/29/EC and 2008/90/EC, Regulations (EC) No 178/2002, (EC) No 882/2004 and (EC) No 396/2005 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, Directive 2009/128/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
and Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council 
Decisions 66/399/EEC, 76/894/EEC and 2009/470/EC, which is referred to in Opinion of Advocate General Bot 
delivered on 12 May 2016, par. 140. 
68  New forms of solidarity have to be explored since the acknowledgement of catastrophic risks, as 
environmental ones, since those risks are not the result of a specific accidents and cannot thus be measured. Still, 
insurances continue to develop technologies that cover such kind of risks, bringing up the question of knowing 
which kind of solidarity they rely on.  
69 Art. 5(1) of Regulation (EU) No 652/2014. 
70 Art. 18(1) d) of Regulation (EU) No 652/2014; Xyllela appears to be a “pest” in conformity with art. 17(a) of 
Regulation (EU) No 652/2014, as it is in the Annex 1, Part A, Section I(b) of Council Directive 2000/29/EC of 8 
May 2000. 
71 D. U. FERNÁNDEZ-BERMEJO, « A Theory on Private Takings: Rule of Law, Democracy and Social State », 
(2016) 28-3 European Review of Public Law 881‑905, 883. 
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spread over all the European collectivity, that the EU participate in only a 50% proportion 
might be criticized72. 
Moreover, Advocate General Bot, as we’ve seen, underlined that Italy was in his opinion 
required to provide a compensation scheme in accordance with the right of the olive tree 
owners to get compensation for their loss of property under Article 17 and 51(1) of the 
Charter of fundamental rights, because it was implementing a EU decision73. The Court of 
Justice did not integrate this dimension in the judgement, may be simply because it did not 
affect directly the validity of the decision of 2015, which was the question it had to solve. 
Since it was a preliminary ruling, the Court of Justice could not really have raised the issue ex 
officio.  
Without any binding legal conclusions about the responsibility of Italy in establishing a 
compensation scheme, the burden to obtain any compensation rests on the olive tree owners. 
They would therefore have to support either introducing legal procedure to enforce Italy to 
comply with its obligation of establishing a compensation scheme, or either turn themselves 
to financial aid that might be obtained through private or public insurances covering 
agricultural risks, if it can apply at all to their specific case74. In last resort, if they fail in 
succeeding in any of those avenues, the dramatic picture would be that they cannot have a 
sufficient income to sustain their olive business, that they go bankrupt and that they resign to 
rely on Italian social security for living75.  
This might be, and probably is, quite an extrapolation of the situation. However, it was meant 
to show that even though there are legal dispositions that provide new and EU-wide solidarity 
for addressing the financial burden of risk management, it might not be applied in practice. 
                                                           
72 One might see the expropriation as a legal tool still carrying the liberal constitutional context. See D. U. 
FERNÁNDEZ-BERMEJO, « A Theory on Private Takings: Rule of Law, Democracy and Social State », (2016) 28-3 
European Review of Public Law 881‑905, 883. Then, we might therefore rely on the commutative justice 
perspective, which imply that compensation must be provided by the beneficiaries of the expropriations. If we 
consider that the EU is the beneficiary, to make the Member State the one to implement the compensation 
scheme does not seem consequent. In the Risk Society of Beck, risks must be distributed above the nation states; 
and shared risks means shared costs. In addition, it might be of some interest to think about which are the real 
beneficiaries of the measures under the “European collectivity” : the Member States, the Europeans residents, or 
the European economic actors? And what is, exactly, that benefit?  
73 Opinion of Advocate General Bot delivered on 12 May 2016, par. 139. 
74 Of course, one might be aware that “[t]his does not necessarily mean that common and readily available types 
of insurance would cover all the variety of losses that might be incurred in “public necessity” cases […]. 
Destruction to prevent flood, spread of disease, or sinking of a vessel may be more difficult to bring within the 
terms of many policies”. See O. M. REYNOLDS, « Is “public necessity” necessary? », (1976) 29 Oklahoma Law 
Review 861‑881, 880. If this was true in 1976, there is no doubt that with the growing numbers of catastrophic 
risks that might lead to emergency measures on the basis of public necessity, there is no doubt that insurers 
might have worked the insurance policies to limit the claims. 
75 Looking at the burden of the individuals having to claim compensation for the eradication of their olive trees, 
we might draw a parallel with the fact that in many jurisdictions, there is no requirement to establish a 
compensation scheme prior to an expropriation any expropriation. However, this is not the case in Germany, 
which makes the constitutional validity of an expropriation rely on such compensation scheme, which definitely 
relieves the burden of the victim. In EU law, as we have seen here, “[i]n contrast to article 14(3) of the German 
Basic Law, which requires that the law authorizing an expropriation must explicitly make provision for just 
compensation (Junktim-Klausel), EU fundamental rights law does not contain such a requirement.” See T. M. 
DRALLE, Ownership Unbundling and Related Measures in the EU Energy Sector: Foundations, the Impact of 
WTO Law and Investment Protection, Cham, Springer, 2018, p. 73. 
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So, while the EU single market gets a strong and rapid protection against the risks of the 
spread of Xyllela through measures of eradication, individuals that suffer the consequences of 
losing their trees, a part of their income source, must fight for compensation and protection of 
their interests. This again proves how the social and economic rationalities in the EU have 
disconnected from each other, and how the economic market got autonomous from social 
matters in the legal discourse76.  
In any case, the purpose here was first to demonstrate that potentially catastrophic harms to 
environment can hardly be managed by action/reaction measures such as the ones that are 
relevant to the Giovanni Pesce case, though we must agree those might show to be necessary 
too to some extent; risk management should rather be “boundaryless”, in the sense it 
questions our ways of living in relation to our environment in a broad and whole sense, and 
therefore should not be partitioned in different hermetic disciplinary discourse77. On the other 
hand, the intention was to propose a critical interpretation of the financial aspect of risk 
management illustrated by the Giovanni Pesce case: that is, even though legal solutions might 
be said to exist to address contemporary risk and their management, as compensation 
obligations and shared competency, in practice and in a superficial treatment of the case, it is 
still the National Welfare State model that we first see as responsible, and it is still this same 
National Welfare State model that acts as a last resort insurer. 
In addition, one might argue that the compartmentation of risk management in the legal 
discourse that we’ve tried to acknowledge in this paper might provide the public a misleading 
understanding of a situation, and prevent it from forming a well-informed opinion about the 
legitimacy of institutional objectives, socially and economically. In this context, it might be 
difficult to promote a real social dialogue about the measures that are to be taken. Indeed, the 
precautionary principle, as a procedural decision making tool, should relate to democratic 
participation in risk management. Then, in a more radical way, one might even see in such 
ramification of the legal discourse as a way of not pointing fingers at the economic 
development and industrialisation process, or to say it otherwise, as a way to maintain an 
organized irresponsibility pattern78. May be this whole “staging”, to use the expression of U. 
Beck, of contemporary risks and their management aims to hide the lost faith in the capitalist 
utopias, which still paradoxically guide our actions79. Because, as Ulrich Beck said, the risks 
we manage might be, in the end, only a reflection of ourselves:  
“Les risques dont on fait l’expérience présupposent un horizon normatif de sécurité perdue, de 
confiance brisée. C’est pourquoi les risques, même lorsqu’ils apparaissent muets, recouverts 
                                                           
76 This argument of the “autonomisation” of the market has been beautifully presented by Mirelle Delmas-Marty 
in a class given at College de France called “Sens et non sens de l’humanisme juridique”, especially in the class 
of Janurary 26, 2011. She refers amongst others to A. SUPIOT, “Les avatars de l’Europe sociale”, L’esprit de 
Philadelphie, Seuil, 2010 and A. SUPIOT, “Contribution à une analyse juridique de la crise économique de 
2008”, (2010) 149(2) RIT. 
77  “[…] the unforeseen consequences of functional differentiation can no longer be controlled by further 
functional differentiation. In fact, the very idea of controllability, certainty or security – so fundamental to first 
modernity – collapses”. See U. BECK & C. LAU, “Second Modernity as a Research Agenda: Theorical and 
Empirical Explorations in the “Meta-Change” of Modern Society”, (2005) 56(4) British Journal of Sociology 
525, 526. 
78 See U. Beck, World at Risk, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2009, p. 7-8. On this topic, see also A. SUPIOT & M. 
DELMAS-MARTY, Prendre la responsabilité au sérieux, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 2015.  
79 On the topic of the utopias related with capitalism, see P. ROSANVALLON, Le capitalisme utopique. Histoire de 
l’idée de marché, Paris, Seuil, 1999. 
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d’un habillage de chiffres ou de formules, restent par définition liés à un point de vue ; c’est 
pour cela qu’ils demeurent des poétisations mathématiques de visions déçues de la vie qui 
mériterait d’être vécue. Or, ces poétisations elles-mêmes demandent à être crues, ce qui 
équivaut à dire qu’on ne peut en faire l’expérience comme ça. En ce sens, on peut dire que les 
risques sont en négatif les images concrétisées des utopies dans lesquelles est conservé et 
revitalisé ce qu’il y a d’humain dans le processus de modernisation, ou du moins ce qu’il en 
reste.”80 
We might then just have to imagine new utopias, utopias that would lead us back to having 
faith in our own humanity, if it has ever been the case. 
                                                           
80  U. BECK, La société du risque. Sur la voie d'une autre modernité, Paris, Aubier, 2001, p. 51. 
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